Nový draft IETF pkix : Traceable Anonymous Certificate
19.06.2008Abstract:
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a powerful means of
authenticating individuals, organizations, and computers (e.g.,
web servers). However, when individuals use certificates to
access resources on the public Internet, there are legitimate
concerns about personal privacy, and thus there are increasing
demands for privacy enhancing techniques on the Internet.
In a PKI, an authorized entity such as a certification Authority
(CA) or a Registration Authority (RA) may be perceived,
from a privacy perspective, as a "big brother," even when a CA
issues a certificate containing a Subject name that is a
pseudonym. This is because such entities can always map a
pseudonym in a certificate they issued to the name of the real
user to whom it was issued. This document defines a practical
architecture and protocols for offering privacy for a user who
requests and uses an X.509 certificate containing a pseudonym,
while still retaining the ability to map such a certificate to
the real user who requested it. The architecture is compatible
with IETF certificate request protocols such as PKCS10 [2]
CRMF [3]. The architecture separates the authorities involved
in issuing a certificate: one for verifying ownership of a
private key (Anonymous Issuer) and the other for validating
the contents of a certificate (Blind Issuer). The end-entity
(EE) certificates issued under this model are called
Traceable Anonymous Certificates (TACs).
Zdroj: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-tac-00.txtAutor: JP
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